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ABSTRACT
Three studies look at whether the assumption of causal determinism (the assumption that
all else being equal, causes generate effects deterministically) affects children's imitation
of modeled actions. We show that, even when the frequency of an effect is matched, both
preschoolers and toddlers imitate actions more faithfully when modeled actions are
deterministically rather than probabilistically effective. A third study suggests that
preschoolers' imitation is affected, not just by whether the'agent's goal is satisfied but
also by whether the action is a reliable means to the goal. Children's tendency to generate
variable responses to probabilistically effective modeled actions could support causal
learning.
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Abstract
Three studies look at whether the assumption of causal determinism (the assumption that
all else being equal, causes generate effects deterministically) affects children's imitation
of modeled actions. We show that, even when the frequency of an effect is matched, both
preschoolers (N = 60; mean: 56 months) and toddlers (N = 48; mean: 18 months) imitate
actions more faithfully when modeled actions are deterministically rather than
probabilistically effective. A third study suggests that preschoolers' (N = 32; mean: 58
months) imitation is affected, not just by whether the agent's goal is satisfied but also by
whether the action is a reliable means to the goal. Children's tendency to generate
variable responses to probabilistically effective modeled actions could support causal
learning.
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Imagine that every time your Uncle Robbie makes a souffle it rises perfectly, but
when your Uncle Sam makes a souffle, sometimes it rises and sometimes it falls.
Although you might learn to cook both by observing Uncle Sam's failures and by
observing Uncle Robbie's successes, if you were learning from Uncle Robbie, you would
probably imitate his technique faithfully, while if you were learning from Uncle Sam,
you might be inclined to vary the recipe. That is, the precision with which you imitate an
observed action might be affected by your beliefs about the efficacy of the action;
optimal learning might depend on knowing when to imitate and when to explore. In this
study, we look at whether a similar proposition is true for young children: do children
differentially imitate deterministically and probabilistically effective actions?
Previous research on children's imitation raises a puzzle. On the one hand,
children are very good at reproducing modeled actions. Indeed, in some contexts,
children will faithfully copy even arbitrary, unnecessary actions. For instance, children
will imitate elaborate, causally irrelevant routines to open a box even when the
mechanisms that could be used to open the box directly are obvious (Homer & Whiten,
2005; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2006; Whiten, Custance, Gomez, Teixidor, & Bard, 1996).
Similarly, children will copy an actor who, for no apparent reason, activates a toy with
her head, even though the children can (and often do) also activate the toy with their
hands (Geregely, Bekkering, Kiraly, 2002; Meltzoff 1992).
On the other hand, children will sometimes override modeled actions in order to
generate their own means to inferred ends. Thus for instance, toddlers do not copy
actions that fail to achieve the agent's intended outcome (Meltzoff, 1995). If an adult
pulls on a barbell toy but does not pull it apart, 18-month-olds do not imitate the 'failed'
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action; rather, they act to achieve the inferred goal of the action -- they pull apart the toy.
Critically, children in the study were not given any linguistic or affective cues ("There!"
or "Whoops!"; see e.g., Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998) suggesting that the
modeled actions failed to achieve the agent's goals. The children simply saw for
example, that an actor pulled on a toy and the toy did not separate. Thus although
Meltzoff noted that the physical relations by themselves were not sufficient to lead
children to compete the causal action (i.e., children do not 'read through the goals' of the
actions if the actions are performed by a machine), it is perhaps equally noteworthy that
the physical/mechanical relations by themselves were sufficient to support children's
inferences about the agent's intentions. That is, in the absence of linguistic or affective
cues, children can identify the goals of intentional action by assuming that intentional
actions will enact expected causal relations (e.g., between pulling and separating).
The puzzle then concerns the role of causal knowledge in children's imitative
learning. Why do children sometimes seem to suspend their own causal knowledge in
order to copy modeled actions faithfully (even when there are simpler means to the end)
but at other times use their causal knowledge to override modeled actions in favor of
novel means to inferred ends? What predicts the fidelity with which young children
reproduce modeled actions?
Gergely and colleagues have proposed that some differences in children's
imitation can be explained by assuming that children respect a principle of rational
action (Csibra & Gergely, 1998; Gergely & Csibra, 1997; Gergely & Csibra, 2003;
Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995). That is, children may assume that intentional
actions performed by rational agents are optimal within the constraints of the situation. If
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children observe actions that appear to be sub-optimal (e.g., an adult using her head to
activate a toy or using arbitrary routines to open a box), they may nonetheless assume
that "there must be a good reason" (Gergeley et al., 2002) for the agent's choice of
action. In the absence of an obvious 'good reason' for the action, children might assume
the action has an unobserved causal relationship to the effect or they might revise their
understanding of the agent's goals (e.g., they might assume the goal was to demonstrate a
convention or ritual). In either case, children should imitate the modeled action
faithfully.
However, situational constraints can provide an obvious 'good reason' for the
modeled action. As elegantly demonstrated by an extension of Meltzoff's (1988) light-
activation paradigm, if the situational constraints on the actor and the child are different,
the child may not imitate the modeled action. In the new paradigm, the actor again used
her head to activate a toy, however, this time the actor's hands were occupied holding a
blanket. In this case, children did not imitate the head action; instead they activated the
toy with their hands (Gergely et al., 2002). The situational constraint (holding the
blanket) provided an explanation for the actor's unusual action, thus we suggest,
screening-off(Reichenbach, 1956) a causal role for the particular means used to achieve
the dominant goal (activating the light). Since the child was not also imitating the
ancillary goal of holding a blanket, this analysis freed the child to (a) infer the causal
structure of the main event (depressing the button makes the light go on), and then (b)
achieve the actor's dominant goal by novel but simpler means (using their hands).
We are sympathetic to the idea that children adopt a principle of rational action,
but we note that this proposal does not resolve our original puzzle. The claim that
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children assume that rational agents act optimally with respect to situational constraints is
prima facie incompatible with the fact that children recognize that adults' actions are
sometime ineffective. As researchers have noted, "judgments about the 'rationality' of
means always translate into judgments of 'efficacy"' (Gergely & Csibra, 2003, p. 290).
If children assume that agents perform the most rational action available given the
constraints of the situation, it is difficult to understand how children might construe
modeled intentional actions as 'failed' actions. Why would a child assume that an adult
who activates a toy with her head (instead of her free hands) is acting optimally, but that
an adult who pulls on a toy but fails to separate it is not?
It is tempting to conclude that children assume that modeled actions are optimal
when the actions achieve the agent's goal and not when they fail. Note however, that this
presumes that children can simply 'read off the success or failure of the agents' goal
from the sequence of events. This may indeed be the case when the agent provides
explicit linguistic and affective cues about whether or not her goal has been achieved.
However if an agent for instance, pulls on a toy, it is possible to infer that the agent failed
in her goal to separate the toy, but it is also possible to infer that the agent succeeded in
her goal to pull on the toy. Critically, if children always assume that agents act
optimally, the inference that the adult succeeded should be the preferred inference. That
is, under the assumption that adults always take the most rational action given the
situational constraints, children should not infer that they could improve upon the
observed action.
Here we suggest that although children do assume that agents act rationally with
respect to their goals, they do not make this assumption uncritically. We suggest that
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children analyze goal-directed actions in the context of their broader causal knowledge.
As discussed, there is considerable evidence that, given common situational constraints,
children faithfully imitate arbitrary, causally irrelevant actions (activating a toy with their
heads, engaging in elaborate rituals to open a box). We suggest that this is because
arbitrary actions are, by definition, actions about which children have few prior
expectations. If children do not have sufficient prior causal knowledge to evaluate the
efficacy of the modeled actions, we expect that children will adopt a principle of rational
action and assume the adult actions are optimal. Provided the modeled actions are not
screened-off by a known relationship to an ancillary goal, children should imitate such
actions faithfully. Because children's tendency to imitate arbitrary actions has been well
established by previous research, we will not replicate that aspect of our analysis here.
However, if children do have sufficient prior knowledge to evaluate the
relationship of the modeled action to the goal, we predict that children will imitate the
modeled action faithfully only if they construe the action as an optimal means to the
inferred end. Here we focus on a fundamental, context-independent criterion for the
optimality of an action: whether or not the action is construed as a reliably effective
means to the inferred end. (In previous studies, researchers have focused primarily on
whether actions were optimal with respect to heuristics such as the "familiarity" or
"naturalness" of the action; Gergeley et al., 2002). Given familiar, non-arbitrary
relationships between modeled means and ends, we believe children's own causal
judgments about the efficacy of the action can override the assumption that the agents'
actions are optimal. If children believe the modeled action is not an effective means to
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the inferred end, we predict that children will innovate their own means to the inferred
end rather than imitate the modeled behavior.
There is suggestive evidence that children do use their background causal
knowledge to identify actions that are effective means to intended goals. For instance,
when children are shown a correct and incorrect solution to a novel problem (retrieving a
toy through either a blocked or an open hole in a tube), they selectively imitate the more
effective action (Want & Harris, 2001). Additionally, children tend to faithfully imitate
actions that enable other actions (e.g., putting a horse on a panel and then tipping the
panel to make a rocking horse) but they displace or omit causally irrelevant actions
(patting the horse's mane; Bauer, 1992; Bauer & Hertsgaard, 1993; Bauer & Mandler,
1989). Research also suggests that children are sensitive to hierarchies of goal-directed
actions; when children fail to imitate modeled actions faithfully, they tend to err more
often on subordinate goals than on dominant goals (Bekkering, Brass, Woschina, &
Jacobs, 2005; Bekkering, Wolschlager, & Gattis, 2000; Carpenter, Call & Tomasello,
2005; Gergeley et al., 2002; though see Brindley, Bird, & Heyes, under review, for an
opposing view). For example, children who infer that the actor's goal is to reach for a
left or right dot rarely err in imitating the choice of dot but occasionally err in imitating
the choice of the ipsilateral or contralateral hand. This suggests that children distinguish
actions that are causally relevant (e.g., direction of reach) and irrelevant (choice of hand)
to the dominant goal.
Similarly, we suggest that the results of Meltzoff's seminal study (1995) were
predicated on children's considerable prior knowledge about both the modeled actions
and outcomes. The stimuli were designed to support robust inferences about both the
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anticipated and the observed effects of the modeled action (e.g., that pulling would lead
to separating and that the toy didn't separate because the adult didn't pull hard enough).
The claim that children have such prior causal knowledge is substantiated by the finding
that toddlers can produce the target action (pulling) even when they are shown only the
initial and end state of the toy (Huang, Heyes, & Charman 2002). We suggest that such
robust prior causal knowledge allows children to evaluate the efficacy of the agents'
actions, both to infer the agents' goal and to identify more effective means of achieving
the goal.
However, there is little direct evidence that children can use an independent
causal analysis of an event to evaluate the efficacy of modeled actions. In particular,
there is no evidence that children faithfully imitate actions they construe as effective but
innovate their own means to ends when they construe the modeled action as ineffective.
In the current set of experiments, we look at contexts in which we expect children to have
strong prior causal assumptions and we look at how children's judgments of causal
efficacy affect the fidelity with which they imitate modeled actions. We predict that if
children construe a modeled action as an optimally effective means to the inferred goal,
they will imitate the action faithfully; if they believe the observed action is not reliably
effective they will be more likely to pursue their own means to the inferred end.
It is important to note that our analysis implies that children are actively
interpreting the modeled actions and outcomes. The analysis does not depend on
children's knowledge about other means to the inferred end. Children may know, for
instance, many ways to activate a button or open a box and yet not have strong
expectations (because the tasks were designed to circumvent such knowledge) about the
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relationship between head movements and button activation, or between arbitrary rituals
and box opening. In contrast, children do have prior knowledge about the relationship
between pulling on an object and the object coming apart. When children have such
relevant causal knowledge, we believe they to bring it to bear in analyzing the efficacy of
the modeled means to the goal. One interesting implication of this account (because it
does not depend not on children's knowledge of alternative means to the intended
outcome) is that children should not faithfully imitate actions they construe as ineffective,
even if they do not know alternative, more effective means to the end. That is, we predict
that children will explore novel actions rather than imitate modeled actions that they
believe are unreliable.
While previous studies investigating the effect of causal knowledge on children's
imitation have focused primarily on children's understanding of physical mechanisms
and affordances (e.g., pull-apart toys, Huang et al., 2002; Meltzoff, 1995; rakes, Nagell,
Olguin, & Tomasello; 1993; trap tubes, Want & Harris, 2002; bolts and latches, Homer &
Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2006; Whiten et al., 1996; balls and cups; Bauer, 1992), here
we investigate how children's imitative learning is affected by more fundamental,
abstract causal beliefs. In particular we look at whether children's imitation is affected
by the assumption that physical causes generate effects deterministically.
Previous research suggests that preschoolers are causal determinists; when causes
appear to act probabilistically, children infer the existence of unobserved causes (Schulz
& Sommerville, 2006). If children believe that, all else being equal, physical causes
always generate their effects, then they should construe deterministically effective actions
as optimally effective. All else being equal, children should imitate deterministically
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effective actions faithfully. However, children should not accept that physical causes
might generate effects probabilistically. If children observe an intervention that generates
effects only some of the time, they should believe the effect could, in principle, be
generated more reliably. Thus if children observe an action that is only probabilistically
effective, they should be less likely to imitate the modeled action and more likely to
explore alternative actions. Note, also that if children are causal determinists, then even
if they do not have any other prior knowledge about a modeled action (e.g., the action is
pushing a novel switch), the assumption of determinism should affect their analyses of
the event.
In Experiments 1 and 2, we look at whether, controlling for the frequency and
salience of the action/outcome relationship, children imitate deterministically effective
actions more precisely than probabilistically effective actions. Earlier research on
children's belief in causal determinism focused on preschoolers, so we begin (in
Experiment 1) by looking at whether four-year-olds differentially imitate
deterministically and probabilistically effective actions. In Experiment 2 we replicate the
study with 18-month-olds.
Two final notes are in order. First, there has been ongoing debate (see
Woodward, 2005, for a review) over whether the ontogenesis of children's understanding
of goal-directed actions involves relatively rich theory of mind inferences (that agents
want to achieve particular outcomes) or simpler teleological inferences (that agents tend
to move in straight paths, avoid obstacles, etc.; Csibra & Gergely, 1998; Gergely &
Csibra, 1997; 2003; Gergely et al., 1995). Because our studies involve children 18-
months old and older and there is independent evidence (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1995;
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Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997) that children of this age attribute mental states like intentions
and desires to agents, we use the terms 'goal' and 'intention' interchangeably throughout.
(Our studies do not rely on children's understanding of representational mental states like
belief.) Second, in contrast to the comparative literature (Call & Carpenter, 2001;
Tomasello & Call, 1997; Whiten & Ham, 1992), the developmental literature typically
uses the term 'imitation' to cover an extensive range of responses to modeled behaviors
(e.g., mimicry, outcome emulation, goal emulation, and imitation). To avoid confusion
in reviewing the literature, we follow this tradition and refer primarily to 'imitation'
throughout; we distinguish contexts in which children do and do not faithfully imitate
modeled actions in discussion.
Experiment 1
We test preschoolers in four conditions. In the Deterministic condition,
children see a sliding switch activate a toy on each of four trials. This evidence is
consistent with the assumption that physical causes act deterministically, and we
predict that children will think this is an optimally effective intervention. Given a
chance to activate the toy, we predict that children will faithfully imitate the modeled
action. In the Stochastic condition, children again see the switch manipulated four
times but the toy activates only on trials one and three. Because the stochastically
effective actions violate the assumption that physical causes should generate effects
deterministically, we predict that children will think that the modeled action is not
optimally effective and will imitate the modeled action less precisely.
However, children might imitate the action in the Stochastic condition less
accurately than in the Deterministic condition simply because the alternating pattern of
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success and failure disrupts the children's attention and impairs their ability to encode
or recall the modeled action. To investigate children's ability to remember the modeled
action, we test a smaller group of children in a Memory control condition. The Memory
control condition is identical to the Stochastic condition with the single difference that
at the end of the trials children are not asked to activate the toy; instead they are simply
asked to reproduce the experimenter's actions. If children are not distracted by the
stochastic outcomes and are able to precisely recall the modeled action, then their
performance in the Memory control should be comparable to their performance in the
Deterministic condition.
Children might also differentially imitate the evidence in the Deterministic and
Stochastic conditions because the two successful trials the Stochastic condition reduce
the salience of the action/outcome relationship or are less reinforcing than the four
successful trials in the Deterministic condition. Similarly, the reduced frequency of the
effect might provide insufficient inductive evidence for the children to conclude that
the observed action is actually a cause of the effect. When the action generates the
outcome only twice, children might be less likely to treat the modeled action as a cause
of the outcome.
To rule out the possibility that children imitate actions less faithfully when an
effect occurs twice on alternating trials rather than four times on consecutive trials, we
test children in a Frequency control condition. This control condition is identical to the
Stochastic condition, except that the children are given a deterministic explanation for
the pattern of evidence: children learn that toy is "on" during the success trials and
"off" during the failure trials. The evidence is thus matched for salience and 'reward'
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value to the evidence in the Stochastic condition but is consistent with the possibility
that physical causes generate effects deterministically. Again, we predict that children
will imitate the modeled action precisely.
Method
Participants
We recruited 60 preschoolers (mean age: 56 months; range: 48 - 65 months) from
the Discovery Center of a metropolitan Science Museum and from urban area preschools.
While most of the children were white and middle class, a range of ethnicities and
socioeconomic backgrounds reflecting the diversity of the local population were
represented. Sixteen children were assigned to a Deterministic condition, 16 to a
Stochastic condition, 12 to a Memory control condition, and 16 to a Frequency control
condition. Approximately equal number of boys and girls participated in each condition
(50% girls overall).
Materials
A freestanding toy light was used. The toy light had an on/off button in back.
When the toy was turned on, it could be activated by a remote control. When activated,
the toy's lights flashed. The real remote control was concealed throughout and the toy
was apparently activated by a (fake) sliding switch. The sliding switch consisted of a
wooden box, 25 cm x 6.9 cm x by 3.8 cm, with a center slit that ran the length of the
box. A knob, 2 cm in diameter, was affixed to a screw inside the slit so that the knob
could be slid along the length of the box. The top surface of the sliding switch was
divided into 20 1.2 cm colored bars. Each bar was a unique color. See Figure 1.
Procedure
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All children were tested individually. The experimenter placed the toy (with the
button set to the "on" position) and the sliding switch on the table. She said, "I'm
going to play with this toy four times and then you will get a chance to play with the
toy." The experimenter slid the knob from the start position at the far end of the sliding
switch (left/right position counterbalanced between children) to the middle of the
sliding switch. She stopped the knob when it was centered directly over the border
separating the middle two colored bars (between the zero marks in Figure 1). She said
"One!" while simultaneously activating the concealed remote control. The toy
activated. After approximately three seconds, the experimenter released the remote
control and simultaneously returned the knob to the end of the slider. The experimenter
repeated this action four times, counting aloud each time. In the Deterministic
condition, the experimenter activated the toy on all four trials. In the Stochastic
condition, the experimenter activated the toy only on trials one and three.
The evidence in the Memory control condition was identical to the evidence in
the Stochastic condition. The Frequency control condition was identical to the
Stochastic condition except that the toy was introduced with the button set to the "off"'
position. When the experimenter introduced the toy to the children, she pointed to the
button in back and said, "See this? This button turns the toy on and off." On the first
and third trials, she said "I'm going to turn the toy on now" and pushed the button to
the "on" position before sliding the switch; on the second and fourth trials she said "I'm
going to turn the toy off now" and pushed the button to the "off"' position before sliding
the switch. After the fourth trial the experimenter pushed the button back to the "on"
position.
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In the Deterministic, Stochastic, and Frequency control conditions, the
experimenter then said, "Now it's your turn" and passed the toy and sliding switch to the
child. In the Memory control condition the experimenter first removed the toy from view.
She then passed only the sliding switch to the child, saying, "Can you do exactly what I
did? Can you put the knob where I put it?"
The duration of the modeled action was matched in all conditions and the
experimenter did not otherwise distinguish the success and failure trials either verbally or
non-verbally. Only the child's first attempt at moving the slider was coded: an "attempt"
was delineated by the child either moving the slider to any position and then sliding it
back to the original end, or by the child moving the slider to any position and then taking
her hand away. On the child's attempt, the experimenter never activated the toy. Only
the first attempt was coded because (after the first attempt failed to produce an effect)
children in both conditions could construe the sliding switch as stochastically effective.
Results and Discussion
Children's responses were videotaped. Children were coded as exactly imitating
the modeled action if they placed the knob on the center line (where the experimenter
had put the knob; between the zero marks in Figure 1) or on the bar immediately to the
left and right of the center line. (Pilot work suggested that if no action was modeled,
preschoolers' acted on the toy by twirling the knob; in this study, all children's first
response was to slide the knob. Thus in all conditions, children's responses were
distinct from baseline activity.) Exact imitation received a score of zero. Other
responses were coded based on their deviation from the modeled action (i.e., children
who stopped the knob one bar past the center bars received a score of +1; children who
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stopped the knob four bars before the center bars received a scored of -4). The second
author coded the number of the colored bar where the child placed the knob; a blind
coder recoded 50% of the data. (Note the actual sliding switch had only colored bars
on it; it did not have printed numbers. The experimenter noted the color of the bar and
then assigned it a number based on the criteria above.) Inter-coder agreement was high
(Cohen's Kappa = .82); disputes were resolved conservatively (i.e., the score closer to
zero was used in the Stochastic condition; the score further from zero was used in all
other conditions).
We compared the number of children who exactly imitated the modeled action
in each condition and the absolute value of children's scores in each condition. In the
Stochastic condition, four of the sixteen children (25%) exactly imitated the modeled
action. By comparison, in both the Deterministic condition and the Frequency control
condition, ten of the sixteen children (62%) exactly imitated the modeled action.
Similarly, in the Memory control condition, ten of the twelve children (83%) re-enacted
the modeled action exactly.
As predicted, children were less likely to imitate the modeled action exactly in
the Stochastic condition than in the Deterministic condition, X2 (1, N = 32) = 4.57, p <
.05. The differential imitation cannot be explained by a difference in children's
encoding or recall for the modeled action or effects due to the reduced frequency of the
outcome, since children were also less likely to imitate the modeled action exactly in
the Stochastic condition than the Memory, X2 (1, N = 28) = 9.33, p < .01, and the
Frequency control conditions, X2 (1, N = 32) = 4.57, p < .05. There was no difference
in children's tendency to perform the exact modeled action in the Deterministic
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condition and the Frequency control (X2 (1, N = 32) = 0, p = ns), the Deterministic
condition and the Memory control, or the Memory control and the Frequency control
(X2 (1, N= 28) = 1.46, p = ns in both cases).
Children received a mean score of 2.72 in the Stochastic condition, compared
with a mean score of 1.75 in the Deterministic condition, .75 in the Memory control,
and .41 in the Frequency control. Children's scores were significantly higher in the
Stochastic condition than the Deterministic condition (one-tailed Mann-Whitney U =
176, N= 32, p < .05), the Memory control (one-tailed Mann-Whitney U = 42.5, N= 28,
p < .005) and the Frequency control (one-tailed Mann-Whitney U = 264.5, N = 32, p <
.001). There was no significant difference between children's scores in the
Deterministic condition and the Frequency control (two-tailed Mann-Whitney U =
131.5, N= 32, p = ns), the Deterministic condition and the Memory control (two-tailed
Mann-Whitney U = 77, N= 28, p = ns), or the Memory control and the Frequency
control (two-tailed Mann-Whitney U = 81.5, N= 28, p = ns). In all conditions, children
who did not imitate the modeled action exactly were just as likely to stop the knob
prematurely as to overshoot the modeled action (46% of non-imitators received scores
< 0; 54% received scores > 0; N = 26, p = ns by binomial test).
Overall, the results of Experiment I suggest that children differentially imitate
deterministically and stochastically effective actions. The results are consistent with
the idea that children expect causes to generate effects reliably; they thus construe
deterministically but not stochastically effective actions as optimally effective and
precisely imitate those actions. Children imitate stochastically effective actions with
less fidelity.
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From this experiment, it is not clear whether children exhibit more variable
responses to stochastically effective actions because they are less motivated to copy
actions that are only effective some of the time or because they are more motivated to
explore alternative, potentially more reliable actions. Further research might clarify the
precise motivation behind children's differential imitation. In this paper, we offer a
computational level account (i.e., addressing goals and logic of the behavior) of how
children's causal knowledge affects their imitation, rather than an account at the level
of the representational algorithm (i.e., how this logic might be implemented; Marr,
1982). It is important to note therefore that both motivations result in an equivalent,
adaptive outcome. Whether children are motivated by dissatisfaction with the modeled
action or by interest in exploring other actions, their tendency to generate variable
responses to probabilistically effective actions will increase the probability that they
discover more reliable means to the end.
Importantly, the control conditions rule out several relatively less interesting
explanations for children's differential imitation. One concern was that children might
have more difficulty encoding or recalling actions when effects occur stochastically
than when they occur deterministically. That is, the pattern of alternating success and
failure might disrupt children's attention to the action on the slider (they might instead
attend more to the toy) and degrade children's memory for the modeled action.
Critically however, children's accurate reproduction of the modeled actions in the
Memory control condition suggests that children do not have difficulty remembering
the action when they observe probabilistic evidence. Although children in the Memory
control observed the very same evidence as children in the Stochastic condition, they
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performed as accurately as children in the Deterministic condition; children's ability to
recall the precise action was not impaired by the probabilistic evidence.
Another concern was that the reduced frequency of the effect might impair
children's understanding of the relationship between the action and the outcome. The
two reinforced trials might be less salient or less reinforcing of the action/outcome
relationship than the four successful trials or might provide weaker inductive evidence
that the switch was a genuine cause of the effect. However, the evidence from the
Frequency control condition suggests that merely reducing the frequency of the effect
does not impair children's ability to recognize that the sliding switch activates the toy.
In the Frequency control condition, the two success trials (alternating with two failed
trials) sufficed for children to reproduce the modeled action precisely. Additionally, as
with the Memory control condition, children's success in the Frequency control
condition mitigates against the possibility that the alternating pattern of success and
failure might have degraded children's memory for the modeled action. Overall, the
results are consistent with the hypothesis that children expect physical causes to
generate effects deterministically and thus faithfully imitate deterministically effective
but not probabilistically effective actions.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 suggests that the imitative behavior of preschoolers is affected by
how reliably actions generate outcomes; however, much of the research on children's
imitative learning has focused on much younger children. In Experiment 2, we replicate
the procedure of Experiment 1 with 18-month-olds. Because we could not be certain that
18-month-olds would distinguish the verbal instructions in the test conditions from those
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in the Memory control condition (and because success in the Frequency control condition
suggests that the modeled action is indeed recalled) we eliminated the Memory control
condition from Experiment 2.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight toddlers (mean: 18 months; range 15-21 months) were tested at the
Discovery Center of a metropolitan Science Museum. While most of the children were
white and middle class, a range of ethnicities and socioeconomic backgrounds reflecting
the diversity of the local population were represented. Sixteen children were assigned to
a Deterministic condition, sixteen to a Stochastic condition, and sixteen to a Frequency
control condition. Approximately equal numbers of boys and girls participated in each
condition (45% girls overall). Three toddlers in the Deterministic condition, 3 in the
Stochastic condition and 4 in the Frequency control condition were dropped from the
study and replaced due to the experimenter's accidental activation of the buzzer
prematurely (one child in each condition) or the child's unwillingness to touch the toy
(the remaining five children).
Materials
The toy light from Experiment 1 was not used in Experiment 2. Instead, a
concealed buzzer was used to create the illusion that the slider itself made noise.
Additionally, the sliding switch from Experiment 1 was modified to make it less
distracting for toddlers. The top surface of the toy was divided into five (rather than
20) uniquely colored 5 cm regions. Each region was further subdivided into four 1.2
cm regions by black lines (identical to the regions in Experiment 1). Instead of the
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knob, a 2 cm long cylindrical bead was threaded onto a wooden dowel that ran the
length of the switch so that the bead could be moved along on top of the center slit. In
the Frequency control condition, a separate button with "on" and "off" positions
marked was also used.
Procedure
The procedure in the Deterministic and Stochastic conditions was identical to
the procedure in Experiment 1, except that in each condition, the experimenter
activated the switch by sliding the center of the bead to the center of the switch while
activating the concealed buzzer. After approximately four seconds, she slid the bead
back to the end of the switch and simultaneously released the buzzer. Because the
sliding switch itself produced the effect (the buzzing noise) and there was no separate
toy, we referred to the sliding switch as the 'toy' throughout.
In the Frequency control, the experimenter introduced the on/off button to the
child before the first trial. She said, "See this? This makes my toy go! Now I'm going
to turn the toy on!" The experimenter pushed the button into the "on" position and said
"On!" After the first trial, the experimenter said, "Now I'm going to turn the toy off!."
and pushed the button into the "off' position, saying "Off!" The button was similarly
turned "on" for the third trial, and "off' for the fourth and final trial. After the fourth
trial, the experimenter turned the button "on" as before and then passed the toy to the
child, saying, "Now you get to play with the toy."
Results
Children's responses were coded as in Experiment 1. Inter-coder agreement was
high (Cohen's Kappa = .&8); disputes were resolved conservatively. Unsurprisingly, as
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a group the toddlers' imitative responses were less exact than the preschoolers'. Using
the criteria set for preschoolers, toddlers rarely produced exact imitations of the
modeled action (across all conditions, 23% of the toddlers scored 0 compared with 57%
of the preschoolers; j(1, N= 108) = 4.93, p < .05). We therefore used more liberal
criteria for coding imitative behavior in the toddlers. Responses in the middle of the
sliding switch (i.e., with an absolute value between 0 and 4) were considered
approximate imitation; responses in the far two quartiles of the sliding switch (i.e., with
an absolute value between 5 and 9) were considered imprecise imitation. (Again,
responses in all conditions were different from baseline responding: if no action was
modeled, toddlers' modal response was to lift the entire switch; in this study, all
children's first response was to slide the knob.)
In the Stochastic condition, five of the sixteen children (31%) approximately
imitated the modeled action, whereas eleven of the sixteen (69%) imitated imprecisely.
By comparison, in both the Deterministic condition and the Frequency control
condition, twelve of the sixteen children (75 %) approximated the modeled action and
only four of the sixteen (25%) imitated imprecisely. Children were significantly less
likely to approximate the modeled action in the Stochastic condition than in the
Deterministic condition, X2(1, N= 32) = 6.14, p < .025, or the Frequency control
condition, X2(1, N= 32) = 6.14, p < .025. There was no difference between children's
responses in the Deterministic condition and the Frequency control, X2(1, N = 32) = 0,
p =ns.
Children received a mean score of 7 in the Stochastic condition, compared with
a mean score of 3.5 in the Deterministic condition and a score of 2.5 in the Frequency
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control. There was a trend for children's scores to be higher in the Stochastic condition
than in the Deterministic condition, one-tailed Mann-Whitney U = 170, N= 32, p =
.056, and the Frequency control, one-tailed Mann-Whitney U = 166, N = 32, p = .079.
There was no significant difference between children's scores in the Deterministic
condition and the Frequency control, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U = 131.5, N = 32, p =
ns. Toddlers who approximated the modeled action were just as likely to undershoot
as to overshoot the zero point, 64% scored in the -4 to -.5 range; 36% scored in the +5
to +4 range; N = 17, p = ns by binomial test. By contrast, toddlers who imitated
imprecisely were more likely to overshoot than undershoot the modeled action across
all conditions, 94% scored in the +5 to +9 range; 6% scored in the -5 to -9 range; N =
16, p < .001 by binomial test. These results corroborate the results in Experiment 1 and
suggest that even 18-month-olds imitate deterministically effective actions more
precisely than probabilistically effective ones.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that children differentially imitate deterministically
effective and probabilistically effective actions. In both experiments, children's accurate
reproduction of the modeled action in the control conditions suggests that children do not
have difficulty encoding actions associated with alternating patterns of successes and
failures, nor do children have difficulty inferring that an action is causally effective from
the evidence of only two successful, non-consecutive, trials. Rather the results are
consistent with the hypothesis that children expect physical causes to act
deterministically and thus construe deterministically but not probabilistically effective
actions as effective means to intended outcomes.
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However, there are two distinct ways in which the assumption of causal
determinism and the observed evidence might affect children's imitative learning: 1) by
affecting children's inferences about whether the agent's goal is satisfied or 2) by
affecting children's inferences about whether the modeled action is a reliable means of
achieving the intended goal. The distinction between these two accounts is quite subtle.
Indeed, we believe that in everyday reasoning, the inferences may be closely related:
children might infer agents' goals by inferring that agents intend their actions to generate
expected effects (as when children use the knowledge that pulling causes separating to
infer that an actor who pulls on a toy intends to separate it; Meltzoff, 1995). Nonetheless,
there is a difference between imitating an action because the action satisfies the agent's
goal and imitating an action because the action is perceived as an effective means to the
goal. The former is based on a contingent fact about the action (whether or not it happens
to achieve the intended outcome); the latter is based on a more stable causal inference
(i.e., whether the action is a deterministically effective means of achieving the intended
outcome).
In the preceding experiments, the satisfaction of the agent's goals and the efficacy
of the actions were conflated: much as children might construe a 'failed' pulling event as
a failure to achieve the agent's goals, children might construe probabilistically effective
actions as failures to achieve agent's intentions. A different but related possibility is that
children might not faithfully imitate the probabilistically effective actions because the
agents' intentions are unclear: given the probabilistic outcomes, children might not know
what the agents' intentions actually were.
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Thus children might not faithfully imitate stochastically effective actions either
because they do not believe such actions satisfy the agents' goals or because they believe
such actions are ineffective means to the goals. One way to dissociate these accounts is
by having the agent make her intentions transparent. If agents provide explicit (affective
and linguistic) information about the desired outcome of their actions, then judgments
about agents' goal satisfaction can be separated from judgments of causal efficacy.
Imagine for instance that Sally and Jane both slide a switch but Sally wants the
toy to activate and Jane does not. If the toy activates whenever either Sally or Jane slide
the switch to the middle (the Deterministic condition), then Sally will always be satisfied
with the outcome of her actions and Jane will never be satisfied with the outcome of her
actions. Additionally, the switch will deterministically achieve Sally's intended outcome
(activating the toy) and reliably fail to achieve Jane's intended outcome (not activating
the toy). By contrast, if the toy activates when Sally slides the switch but not when Jane
does (the Stochastic condition), then both Sally and Jane will be satisfied with the
outcome of their actions. However, although the action, as a contingent fact, always
satisfies the agent who performs the action, the action itself is only stochastically
effective with respect to both intended outcomes: it neither reliably activates nor fails to
activate the toy.
Suppose the child is asked to adopt Sally's goal and make the toy go. There are
three possibilities for how children might imitate the modeled action (see Table 1). One
hypothesis is that children fail to imitate faithfully whenever a modeled action fails to
fulfill an agent's goal. In the Stochastic condition, both agent's goals are always
satisfied; in the Deterministic condition, one agent's goal is never satisfied. This
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suggests that the results of Experiments 1 and 2 should reverse in this experiment:
children should imitate the modeled action more faithfully in the Stochastic condition
than in the Deterministic condition. A second possibility is that children selectively
attend to whether the action satisfies the goals of the agent who shares their own goals.
Because both Sally and the children want to make the toy turn on, children might attend
only to whether or not the action satisfies Sally's goals. If this is the case, then the
children should not show differential imitation in this experiment; Sally is equally
satisfied with the outcome of her actions in both conditions. The third possibility is that
children attend to whether or not the action is a reliable means of achieving the shared
goal. If so, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 should replicate in Experiment 3. Children
should faithfully imitate the action in the Deterministic condition (because the action
deterministically turns on the toy) but not in the Stochastic condition (because the action
only sometimes turns on the toy).
In Experiment 3 we look at children's imitation and predict that children attend,
not only to whether actions happen to satisfy an agent's goal but also to whether actions
are reliably effective means to the intended outcome. We predict that even when even
when agents are as or more satisfied with the outcome of their actions in the Stochastic
condition than the Deterministic condition, children will imitate the modeled action more
faithfully in the Deterministic condition than the Stochastic condition.
Method
Participants
Thirty-two preschoolers (mean: 58 months; range: 46-69 months) were tested at
the Discovery Center of a metropolitan Science Museum. While most of the children
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were white and middle class, a range of ethnicities and socioeconomic backgrounds
reflecting the diversity of the local population were represented. Sixteen children were
assigned to a Deterministic condition and sixteen to a Stochastic condition.
Approximately equal numbers of boys and girls participated in each condition (47% girls
overall). One child in the Stochastic condition declined to touch the sliding switch and
was replaced.
Materials
The toy light from Experiment 1 was used. Although this study involved
preschoolers, the sliding switch from Experiment 2 was used due to mechanical
problems with the sliding switch in Experiment 1. In addition, two stuffed animal
puppets were used: a horse and a dog.
Procedure
The experimenter introduced the child to each of the two animals ("This is Sally
and this is Jane" for girls; "This is Paul and this is Joe" for boys). Using 'Sally' as a
hand puppet (particular puppet counterbalanced across children) the experimenter had
Sally slide the knob to the middle of the sliding switch, as in Experiment 1. When the
knob reached the middle, the experimenter (through the puppet) said "One!" and
simultaneously activated the concealed remote control. The toy activated. After
approximately three seconds, the experimenter released the remote control and
simultaneously had Sally return the knob to the end of the slider. The experimenter had
Sally say, "I like the lights! I wanted the toy to turn on!" (We had the agent express
her intention after performing the action rather than beforehand because we were
concerned that the reverse order might leave the impression that the agent could
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'magically' control the outcome.) The experimenter then removed Sally from view and
repeated the procedure using 'Jane' as the puppet. In the Deterministic condition, the
light again activated; in the Stochastic condition it did not. In either case, 'Jane' said,
"I don't like the lights! I didn't want the toy to turn on!" The entire procedure was
then repeated. After the fourth trial, the children were asked, "Can you show me which
puppet wanted the toy to turn on?" "Can you show me which puppet didn't want the
toy to turn on?" (order of questions counterbalanced between children). The
experimenter then passed the sliding switch and toy to the child and said, "Can you
make the toy turn on?"
Results
All of the children correctly identified which puppet did and did not want the
toy to turn on. Although children were using the sliding switch from Experiment 2
(hence there were only 5 colored regions) there were still 20 marked bars on the switch
thus responses were coded as in Experiment 1. Reponses were coded by the first
author; a blind coder recoded 90% of the data. Inter-coder agreement was high,
Cohen's Kappa = .95; disputes were resolved conservatively.
We compared the number of children who exactly imitated the modeled action
in each condition and the absolute value of children's scores in each condition. In the
Stochastic condition, five of the sixteen children (31%) exactly imitated the modeled
action. By comparison, in the Deterministic condition, eleven of the sixteen children
(69%) exactly imitated the modeled action. Although the outcomes in the Stochastic
condition always fulfilled the agents' goals, children were less likely to imitate the
modeled action exactly in the Stochastic condition than in the Deterministic condition,
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X2 (1, N = 32) = 4.5, p < .05. Children received a mean score of 4.94 in the Stochastic
condition, compared with a mean score of .78 in the Deterministic condition.
Children's scores were significantly higher in the Stochastic condition than the
Deterministic condition, one-tailed Mann-Whitney U = 190.5, N= 32, p < .01. Children
who did not imitate the modeled action exactly were more likely to overshoot the
modeled action than to stop the knob prematurely (12% of non-imitators received
scores < 0; 88% received scores > 0; N= 16, p < .005 by binomial test).
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that in imitating goal-directed
actions, children attend not only to whether the actions fulfill the actor's goal but also
to whether the actions reliably achieve the intended outcome. Even though the
outcomes in the Stochastic condition always fulfilled the agents' goals and even though
the children were asked to adopt Sally's goal of activating the toy and Sally achieved
her goal in both conditions, children imitated the deterministically effective actions
more faithfully than the stochastically effective actions. This suggests that children's
assumption of determinism affects children's inferences about effective means to
inferred ends, not just children's inferences about whether or not the agent's goal is
fulfilled.
Arguably, children's responses might have been affected by the change in task
instructions from "It's your turn" (in Experiments 1 and 2) to "Can you make the toy
go?" We needed to establish a specific goal for the children because if the children
could, in principle, have adopted the goal of 'not activating the toy', the predicted
results (i.e., in Table 1) would differ and there would be no uniform way to interpret the
data. However, we believe the instructions were functionally equivalent to the
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instructions in Experiments 1 and 2 in that all children spontaneously seemed to adopt
the goal of turning on the toy. In all three experiments, children almost always
expressed dissatisfaction when their attempts failed to make the toy go. Indeed, to
avoid frustrating the children, we let them 'try again' after the last trial and allowed
them to activate the toy. Because, in the absence of task instructions, children
spontaneously try to activate the toy, we think it is unlikely that the task instructions
had a significant effect on children's responses.
Note that this experiment does not rule out the possibility that children's
imitative responses were influenced by whether the actions happened to satisfy the
goals of the agents performing the actions. The incongruence, for instance, between
Jane's goal and the outcomes on the Deterministic condition (and the congruence
between her goal and the outcomes in the Stochastic condition) might have highlighted
the fact that the actions in the Deterministic condition always turned on the toy and the
actions in the Stochastic condition sometimes did not. This experiment does suggest
however, that children's imitative learning does not depend only on whether or not the
outcomes of actions satisfy the agents who perform them; children also attend to
whether or not actions are deterministically effective means to inferred ends.
General Discussion
Overall, our results suggest that children's imitative learning is affected by the
probability with which observed actions generate outcomes. Both preschoolers and
toddlers faithfully imitate deterministically effective actions, consistent with the
hypothesis that children expect physical causes to generate effects deterministically
and, all else being equal, construe deterministically effective actions as reliable means
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to inferred ends. However, although children seem to have no difficulty remembering
and encoding probabilistically effective actions, children are less precise in their
imitation of actions that generate effects probabilistically. Indeed, even when a
probabilistically effective action explicitly satisfies the goals of the agent who performs
the action, children seem to infer that the action is not a reliable means to the intended
outcome and do not imitate the action faithfully.
More broadly, this research suggests that children bring their broader causal
knowledge to bear on their analysis of modeled actions. When children have prior
knowledge about the relationship between modeled actions and outcomes (whether
derived from abstract assumptions like determinism or, as in previous studies,
familiarity with particular physical mechanisms and affordances, e.g., Meltzoff, 1995)
they can use this knowledge to evaluate the extent to which the modeled actions are
effective with respect to the intended outcomes. If children construe a modeled action
as an effective means to an inferred end, they imitate it faithfully; otherwise they
generate their own means to inferred ends.
Our proposal contrasts with previous work on causal knowledge and imitative
learning in several respects. First, some researchers have suggested that children's
imitation depends on their knowledge of how actions are "designed to bring about [a]
goal" (Tomasello, 1996, p. 323) and is characterized by "an understanding of both the
behavior's goal and its strategy for achieving that goal" (Tomasello, 1996, p. 324). By
contrast, we suspect that children frequently imitate modeled actions precisely because
they do not understand the relationship between the modeled action and the goal. That
is, we agree with other researchers (Gergely & Csibra, 2006) that, when modeled
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actions are arbitrary, or cognitively opaque, children respect a principle of rational
action. In the absence of knowledge to the contrary, children assume adults act
optimally with respect to their goals given the situational constraints; thus children
faithfully imitate modeled actions when they do not understand them.
Nonetheless, in at least some respects, we share Tomasello's (1996) perspective
that children's own understanding of the relationship between the means and the goal is
relevant to their imitative learning. In particular, we believe that when children have
sufficient causal knowledge to evaluate the relationship between modeled actions and a
goal, children will imitate the modeled actions faithfully only if they construe the
modeled actions as an effective means to the goal. If they believe the modeled actions
are not reliably effective, they will generate more variable, exploratory behavior.
One implication of this account is that toddlers and preschoolers can use their
own knowledge of a domain to assess the rationality of adult actions and, if necessary, to
override information provided by an adult. This prediction is consistent with recent
research (Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig, Clement, & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris,
2006) suggesting that children can use their independent knowledge of a domain to
evaluate the reliability of adults as sources of information. If for instance, an adult
routinely provides incorrect labels for familiar referents (e.g., calling a pencil a shoe)
preschoolers ignore the adult's novel label for a novel referent. However, if the adult
generally provides correct labels for familiar referents, children accept the adult's novel
label for the novel referent (Jaswal & Neely, 2006). We suspect that the children would
also be likely to accept the adult's novel label for the novel referent had the adult
previously offered only novel labels for novel referents. That is, analogously with our
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account, we suggest that if the children are either assured of the adults' accuracy (because
it is consistent with their own knowledge) or ignorant of the adults' accuracy (because
they don't know enough to judge themselves), children assume that the adults'
information is reliable and worth learning. However, if the child knows enough to infer
that the adult is unreliable, children will override the assumption that the modeled
behavior is informative. Our study thus adds to recent evidence suggesting that even
very young children evaluate the reliability of adult behavior with respect to their own
understanding of a domain.
Other recent evidence is also congruent with our analysis. Studies suggest for
instance, that children will faithfully imitate modeled actions if they do not know the
intended effect of the action but will generate their own means to the end if they do
understand the goal (e.g., making a smiley face; Williamson & Markman, in press, see
also Williamson & Meltzoff, 2007). That is, when actions appear to be arbitrary,
children imitate faithfully; however, when children have sufficient knowledge to
evaluate the relationship between the means and the ends, they are not committed to the
modeled action and can generate their own, more efficient, means to the end.
In accordance with recent suggestions, we find it plausible that pedagogical cues
(e.g., calling the child's name, making eye contact, ostensive pointing, etc.) increase the
probability that children will faithfully imitate modeled actions (e.g., Gergely & Csibra,
2003; 2006). Critically however, our experiments show that even in pedagogically rich
contexts, children do not always faithfully learn from adult actions. Although all
conditions in our studies provided equivalent pedagogical cues, children did not always
seem to construe the adult's intentional actions as reliably effective and thus did not
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always imitate the modeled action faithfully. We suggest that the assumption of rational
action, even in pedagogical contexts, can be overridden by children's independent causal
analysis of the event.
Our study also raises several questions. First, as noted (in the Discussion of
Experiment 1), it is not clear whether children's variable imitation of probabilistically
effective actions results from children's relatively low motivation to copy actions that
only work some of the time or from their relatively high motivation to look for more
reliable ways to generate the effect. Future research might dissociate these motivations.
However, as discussed, children's tendency to produce varied responses to stochastic
causality might be advantageous for causal learning regardless of how it is
implemented. Varying their own actions from those of a stochastically effective model
will increase the probability that children discover unobserved variables (i.e., the
factors differentiating the successful and failed trials) and more effective ways of
producing the intended outcome.
Our study was also limited in that the range of children's responses was
deliberately constrained to facilitate coding. The sliding switch moved only along a
single track and children were allowed only a single attempt to generate the effect. It is
important therefore to note that in discussing differential imitation we are focusing on
relatively small changes in children's responses. Even when children did not faithfully
imitate the modeled action with regard to the end point of the action, they did imitate
the modeled action insofar as they manipulated the switch and ran it along the track.
Importantly, this action was distinct from baseline responding (in which children
tended to twirl the knob or pick up the entire switch). Thus one possibility is that even
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if children believe a modeled action is not reliable, they may anchor on the modeled
behavior and assume that exploring a range of behaviors around the action may be
useful. In future research, a paradigm that allows children less restricted opportunities
for exploration might provide further insights into the nature of both imitative and non-
imitative behaviors.
Note also, that when we discuss the 'variability' of children's responses to
probabilistically effective actions, we refer to children's deviation from the modeled
action, rather than their absolute variability (e.g., in the sense of the range of the switch
used). In these studies, for ease of coding, we designed the switch so the affordances
encouraged children to explore the full range of the switch when the modeled action was
not reliably effective. However, the claim that children will exhibit more variable
behavior when a modeled action is probabilistically than deterministically effective does
not predict that children will necessarily exhibit less precise behavior than the behavior
modeled. In principle, when the modeled action was stochastically effective, children
might have gripped the knob more closely, moved it more slowly, and inspected more
carefully to ensure the knob was precisely at the center (while merely copying the action
as we performed it when the action was deterministically effective). Note that had
children taken such pains only in the Stochastic condition, this would still constitute
evidence for differential imitation: children's actions would be more variable (in the
sense of deviating more from the modeled action) in the Stochastic condition than the
Deterministic condition even if they were less variable in an absolute sense (e.g., in using
a more narrow range of the switch).
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We also note that even in the Stochastic condition success and failure trials
alternated reliably. A more strict definition of stochasticity might require a nonfixed,
trial-by-trial contingency between successive states (Cutting, personal communication).
However, for our purposes, it was sufficient that in the Deterministic condition, the
intervention on the observed cause fully accounted for the evidence; in the Stochastic
condition, the observed cause did not. We note however, that even the Deterministic
condition provided only weak evidence (four trials) that the action really was
deterministically effective. Given previous research suggesting that children have an
initial inductive bias towards assuming that physical causes act deterministically
(Schulz & Sommerville, 2006), this small amount of data presumably sufficed for
children to be relatively confident that the observed action always produced the effect.
However, it would be interesting to know how varying the frequency and conditional
probability of the events in both conditions might affect children's imitative learning.
Although in these studies we look exclusively at children's assumption of
physical causal determinism, we do not mean to suggest that children are only
determinists about physical causality. It is possible that children (and adults) might be
no more willing to accept genuinely indeterminate events in the psychological domain
than the physical domain. Future research might investigate the extent to which the
assumption of determinism holds across domains. Additionally, as we have noted
elsewhere (Schulz & Sommerville, 2006), a belief in determinism might be best
characterized as a belief in both of the following propositions: 1) that causes generate
effects deterministically (as studied here) and 2) that all events have causes. The first
proposition implies that children should infer unobserved causes whenever effects
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appear to occur stochastically (that is, whenever the probability of an effect given the
known causes is less than 100%); the second implies that children should infer
unobserved causes whenever effects appear to occur spontaneously (that is, whenever
the probability of an effect in the absence of known causes is more than 0%). Other
researchers have captured a similar distinction, noting that we may assume both that the
complete set of candidate causes would be sufficient to generate an event and that a
sufficient cause of an event is necessary (Gergely and Watson, 1996; Watson, 1979,
1985, 1994). Our experiment suggests that children do not imitate faithfully when the
observed causes are not sufficient to generate the effect. It would be interesting to
know whether children's imitative learning would also be affected if the known causes
were not necessary: that is, if the effect sometimes appeared to occur spontaneously.
Our findings may also be interestingly related to proposals suggesting that even
infants engage in exploratory behavior to estimate the extent to which their own actions
(e.g., babbling, cooing) are both sufficient and necessary causes of maternal responses
(the contingency maximization hypothesis; Gergely & Watson, 1996). It seems possible
that children might generate exploratory actions until they can establish either that their
own actions, or some other event, fully predicts maternal responses. It would be
interesting to know whether infants' exploratory behavior in social domains is affected
by the assumption of determinism.
Critically, although we focus on the relationship between causal knowledge and
imitative learning, we do not mean to imply that causal inference underlies all instances
of imitation. Much research on imitation has focused on what has been called the
correspondence problem (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Heyes, 2001): the problem of how
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perception of a motor action is mapped onto performance of a comparable action.
Recently 'mirror neurons' (Rizzolati et al., 2001) have attracted considerable attention
as a candidate mechanism for solving the correspondence problem by enabling such
supramodal representations. Arguably a wide range of imitative behaviors, including
neonatal imitation (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), unconscious imitation of the mannerisms
of conversational partners (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), and what researchers have called
empathic or altercentric imitation (as when parents feeding an infant unconsciously
open their mouths when the infant does; Braten, 1988), might rely primarily on the
activation of such common representations. In such cases, causal knowledge might be
irrelevant. However, as noted, children do not always 'mirror' observed actions.
Previous research has demonstrated that children's imitation of goal-directed action is
sensitive to children's inferences about the intentional structure of the event (Carpenter,
et al., 1998; Meltzoff, 1995). Here we suggest it is also sensitive to children's
inferences about the causal structure of the modeled event.
Similarly, we don't mean to suggest that children's belief in determinism is only
or even chiefly manifest in imitative learning. Children respond differentially to
probabilistic and deterministic evidence in a wide range of contexts (Kushnir &
Gopnik, 2005; Schulz & Sommerville, 2006). However, we believe that imitative
learning is important both as a method for exploring children's causal beliefs and as a
topic of study in its own right. That is, imitation paradigms can help us understand how
children represent the causal structure of events -- and understanding children's beliefs
about the causal structure of events can help us understand how and why children
imitate modeled actions the way they do. Thus although we expect that children's
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fundamental assumptions about physical causal relations affect their behavior quite
broadly, the relationship between causal knowledge and imitative learning is a fruitful
area for investigation.
Overall, our results suggest that young children's imitative behavior is
remarkably sophisticated. Children analyze goal-directed actions, not just with respect
to physical affordances and visible mechanisms, but also with respect to more abstract
assumptions, including the assumption of causal determinism. Children's evaluation of
the efficacy of the modeled action seems to affect their decision about when to
faithfully imitate and when to innovate with respect to a modeled action. Such
differential imitation of deterministically and stochastically effective actions could
provide very young children with an adaptive mechanism for causal learning.
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Table 1. Predictions for Experiment 3 under three different hypotheses about
what might increase the fidelity of children's imitation.
Deterministic Stochastic Prediction
Action satisfies the goals of No Yes Children will imitate more
all agents who perform the faithfully in Stochastic condition
action. than Deterministic condition.
Action satisfies the goals of Yes Yes Children will imitate faithfully in
the agent who shares the both conditions.
child's goals.
Action is reliable means of Yes No Children will imitate more
achieving the shared goal. faithfully in Deterministic than
Stochastic condition.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Schematic of the toy used in Experiment 1. (The bars are numbered to
illustrate the coding scheme. The numbers below apply when the experimenter moves
the knob from left to right; the numbers are reversed when the knob is moved from
right to left. On the children's toy there were no numbers and each bar was uniquely
colored.)
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